The Father of The H-Bomb Now Advocates Vest Pocket Atomic Bombs, See Page 3.

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. IV, NO. 42 NOVEMBER 5, 1956 101 WASHINGTON, D. C. 15 CENTS

America's Satellites Turn Desperate, Too

If the world's situation were not so explosive, one could see the humor in the past week's events. Titoism suddenly spread to London and Paris from Warsaw and Budapest. Eden and Mollet, with an assist from Ben Gurion, joined Gomulka and Nagy in satellite rebellion. Eden's understatement, in the House of Commons last Wednesday, "It is sometimes a government's duty to make decisions for its own country," was the English gentlemanly equivalent of a whole mob of cheering Poles or Magyars. This was England's declaration of independence from the United States. The State Department's glee over the national risings in Eastern Europe turned to dismay when they spread westward.

Then there were the scenes at the United Nations Security Council when Lodge and Shepilov stood together against Britain, France and Israel. It was almost as if a fellow feeling for once bound together the two great Powers when confronted by rebellious feudatories. For months Nasser and the Arab States had been proclaiming their preparations to crush Israel. Despite the warlike intent, the U.S.S.R. had been pouring arms into Egypt and Dulles more quietly had been supplying them to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Now that Israel had struck a blow without waiting for the Egyptians to learn how to use those new Soviet planes and tanks, Moscow and Washington were as indignant as if they were wholly innocent bystanders.

When Dulles Couldn't See

Only two weeks before, when Syria began to move arms into Jordan and Iraqi troops moved up to the border in preparation for what looked like an attack on Israel, Mr. Dulles saw no reason for alarm. He was asked at his press conference on October 16 "Are we at all disturbed by this Syrian move, sir?" Dulles replied, "We can't complain over the fact that countries which have mutual security pacts help each other in terms of equipment . . . we do the same." This signalled Baghdad that it could supply American arms to Jordan for use against Israel without rebuke from Washington. No advance warning messages were sent off to Iraq. On the contrary, Mr. Dulles began to provide himself with escape clauses in the event of an Iraqi-Jordanian attack. He said "a good deal depends upon what the real purposes and intent" of the arms transfers were; if for aggression, we would assist the victims. But "of course," he added, the trouble is that aggression is not always easy to define and arms that are given in advance for defensive purposes may perhaps be used for other purposes. So," he concluded, "we don't feel really in a position to judge whether that is a justifiable and helpful move or whether it has dangerous implications." Never was myopia more cheerfully endured.

The Israeli Ambassador informed Mr. Dulles on Sunday that Israel had information which led it to fear a recrudescence of *fedayeen* incursions on a large scale in the wake of the Jordanian elections and the military agreement reached by Egypt, Syria and Jordan. These terrorist squads are Nasser's special pride; they operate under Egyptian military command from bases in Egyptian territory; I know from what I saw in Israel last spring what havoc they can wreak. The President's message to Ben Gurion for restraint would have been immeasurably more powerful, it would have had an immediate effect within Israel itself, if it had been accompanied by a similar warning to Nasser not to resume the nocturnal invasions of the *fedayeen*. "No one," Ambassador Eban could complain with justice at the United Nations last week, "ever called a session of the Security Council to condemn these penetrations or to call for their withdrawal." This one-sided attitude has a simple explanation. Both Washington and Moscow have been wooing the Arab States; oil and bases are the prize they seek; both regard not only Israel but the interest of Britain and France as expendable in the contest to decide whether the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. shall be the Paramount Power in the area.

The Anglo-French Viewpoint

The threat to the Atlantic Pact must be seen from the British and French point of view. It is one thing to seek to maintain peace, and to mediate the quarrel over Suez, it is another surreptitiously to support Nasser by allowing him to hire American pilots, by keeping dollar revenues open to him and by resuming American aid as was done only a few days ago. From the British and French viewpoint, this meant that while restraining them, we were helping Nasser. The whole picture cannot be seen unless one steps back and looks at how the U.S. is slowly taking over the dominant role in all North Africa from Casablanca to Cairo as Anglo-French power there is liquidated; the new governments in Morocco and Tunis hope to become American financial dependents. Nasser has Washington bidding against Moscow for his friendship and allegiance. This is what created a common interest among Britain, France and Israel; what looks like an ungrateful conspiracy to

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Our Election Choices

For Stevenson and Kefauver; for the Democrats generally; but in the Senate races for four Republicans: Javits in New York, John Sherman Cooper in Kentucky, Wiley in Wisconsin; and Prescott Bush in Connecticut. We are for Javits because of his record; for Cooper, because of his liberalism; for Wiley, as a final blow to the McCarthyites; and for Bush because Thomas E. Dodd, his Democratic opponent, was the chief architect of the Nixon-like foreign policy portion of the Democratic platform.

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The New Deal's Leading Water-and-Power Expert Finds Egypt's Dam Scheme Unsound

Famous Engineer Asks Whether Aswan Dam Project Is "Panacea or Politics?"

Completely new light is cast on the Aswan Dam project by a report, "Panacea or Politics?", released by the Public Affairs Institute in Washington last week (312 Penn. Ave. S.E., 25c). The report is given weight by its authorship. It was written by the engineer Morris Llewellyn Cooke, a lifelong progressive and one of the world's outstanding authorities on water resources. He was chairman of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission under Truman and the first director of the Rural Electrification Administration under FDR.

The study is based in part on hitherto unpublished memoranda of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It doubts the economic feasability of the dam and regards its motivation as primarily political. "The High Aswan Dam scheme," Cooke writes, "offered Nasser a symbol around which to rally and hold Egyptian political support for his regime. The West on the other hand made its offer of aid primarily for the political purpose of inducing Nasser to curtail his dealings with the Communists."

Regional Plan Proposed Instead

Cooke proposes instead a $500,000,000 United Nations Resources Development Board for Africa and the Middle East. He calls for a regional water and power program for the Nile, taking into account the interests of all the countries in which it rises and through which it flows: Uganda, Tanganyika, Kenya, the Belgian Congo, Ethiopia and the Sudan as well as Egypt.

Cooke calls attention to the most comprehensive scheme of this kind ever developed—by three Western experts on the staff of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. Their report, "The Future Conservation of the Nile" was published by the Ministry in 1946. Perhaps the most striking feature of this proposal was the use of the Central African lakes from which the Nile flows as the natural storage centers to conserve the water and smooth out cyclical variations in the flow.

The Sudanese government, which believes the Aswan project hydrologically unsound, makes the point that there is little evaporation in the area of the lakes whereas "the rates of evaporation loss on the Main Nile north of Khartoum, and at Aswan in particular, are among the largest in the world." A Sudanese statement cited by Cooke points out that the average annual loss by evaporation from the surface of the proposed Aswan reservoir would be equivalent to a layer of water ten feet deep.

Another Romantic Moment In The Glamorous Annals Of The U.S. Foreign Service

"Still dependent on frequently conflicting newspaper reports for its best information, the State Department continued to proceed with caution today in reacting to the week-old Hungarian revolution. U.S. Counsellor Barnes reported as late as yesterday from Budapest that his legation is 'very unclear about the outline of military development' in Hungary. His entire staff, he said, has been concentrated in the American legation 'as a precautionary measure.' . . . State Department officials here [i.e. in Washington] have the impression that few of its legation personnel are venturing out into the streets of Budapest, so their knowledge of goings-on is largely confined to what they can see out the windows."

—Washington Evening Star, Oct. 29.

Inflation's Danger In A Poor Country

Cooke believes the withdrawal of the U.S. offer to finance the dam was sound but that "the sudden and peremptory manner" was wrong. He says that "in a rich country with a stable and experienced government, the expenditure of $1,350,000,000 on one irrigation and power dam would be a matter of the most serious concern. Not even the U.S. has ever undertaken a single project of such magnitude." He sees such a project in a poor country as involving the most serious threat of inflation unless accompanied by the strictest control of the budget and the economy.

Instead Egypt has authorized scores of other industrial projects, mortgaged her main cash crop cotton to the Soviet bloc for arms and increased military expenditures to the point where they amount to $10 a year per capita "in a nation where the per capita income, according to Nasser himself, is $67.20." Cooke concludes that between the arms-for-cotton deal with the Soviets and the huge internal military budget "it would now appear impossible for Egypt, with or without Suez canal revenues, to mobilize the financial resources necessary to complete the project."

U. S. Press Ignores H-Bomb Discussion in British House of Commons

Though of obvious relevance to the H-bomb debate in the American presidential campaign, the U.S. press virtually ignored discussion of the subject in the British House of Commons on Oct. 24. The parliamentary report in the air-mail edition of The Times of London (Oct. 25) shows that the British government, unlike the American, is prepared to discuss the question of limiting nuclear tests separately from a general disarmament convention "if that meets," Selwyn Lloyd said in response to a question from Laborite Arthur Henderson, "with the approval of the other powers concerned and appears to offer better prospects of agreement."

When another Laborite pointed out that in a few years there would be five or six other nations in Europe beside the Big Three "capable of making these beastly things" and asked whether this did not "make it all the more urgent that some decision should be arrived at quickly," the Foreign Secretary replied, "I entirely agree." When another Laborite asked whether the British government would take the initiative toward a limitations agreement, Lloyd replied that "no open public initiative" had been taken. This may hint at private talks.

Questions were also raised about Field Marshall Montgomery's statement in the Times of October 11 [quoted in our last issue, IFS] that in the event of war he would not hesitate to use A and H bombs, adding "personally I would use them first and ask afterwards." A Laborite wanted to know "whether this was a serious threat of insubordination or simply a piece of self-advertising buffoonery" and whether it "shows the Field Marshal quite unfit" to be deputy NATO commander. Mr. Lloyd disclaimed responsibility for Montgomery's statements.

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The Army's Chief of Staff Seems More Sensible Than The Army's Fans

The Father of The H-Bomb Becomes Advocate of Safe Vest Pocket Atomic War

Firemen have their "buffs," *afficianadoes* of conflagration, who leap from bed at night to follow the engines when the alarms come in. The Association of the U.S. Army is made up of the "buffs" of infantry war; it is the cheering section, the sounding board, of the U.S. Army. It held its annual meeting here last week-end and the main topic of discussion was nuclear war; the main speaker, Dr. Edward Teller, "Father of the H-bomb."

The concern was not with the dangers of nuclear war; indeed there was a hint in the address of General William G. Wyman, Commanding General of the Continental Army Command, that such talk might be "the corrosive words of the enemy's agents and their fellow travellers in this country." The concern of the gathering was with the fascinating new problem in the game of war: how to adapt tactics to nuclear weapons. The small boy mentality is never far from the surface of the warrior mind, and here was a wonderful new toy, the biggest boom-boom of them all.

The problem is a cute one. Mass armies will be sitting ducks, big fat juicy targets, in a nuclear war. The problem is to break up one's own forces into small highly equipped units yet at the same time force the enemy to concentrate into masses large enough to make atomic attack pay.

The problem in the gobbledygook of the military is "target acquisition." The Army's Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, stressed the need for developing and holding "a relative advantage in the field of so-called target acquisition." He explained that without this "relative superiority in atomic weapons has little meaning."

Psychiatric Note

"Washington, Oct. 27 (U.P.)—The Government announced today that it was developing programs for banks and top industrial leaders to follow in event of an atomic attack."

What do they do, just jump into the nearest Cadillac?

"Past difficulties in locating targets for conventional weapons," General Taylor explained, "have been compounded in the case of the vastly more efficient atomic weapons. The expenses of these weapons, their great destructiveness, *and their potential hazard to our own forces* [italics added] are potent reasons against their promiscuous employment."

The New "Hazard"

Professional soldiers have been able to regard with equanimity the fact that until now in war it has been impossible to avoid killing civilians in the process of killing enemy soldiers. But nuclear war holds a new nightmare. It becomes difficult to keep from killing one's own soldiers in the process of killing the enemy's. This is the new "hazard" to which General Taylor referred.

How deal with it? How move the human pieces effectively under the new conditions? "The efforts of technology will never suffice alone," General Taylor said, "they must be supplemented by tactics designed to cause the enemy to create remunerative targets. . . . The purpose of land maneuver becomes that of finding *or forming* [italics added] suitable enemy atomic targets." The enemy must be forced to concentrate, perhaps by threat of break-through, perhaps by threat of para-troop invasion. But how force him to concentrate without concentrating one's own forces in the same area?

How Much Is A Nuclear "Minimal"?

"There is not one among us who did not have nightmares about the future conflict in which the full fury of nuclear bombs might be loosed. The thinking of many has been paralyzed by this prospect. We have been led to distinguish in a way which to me seems arbitrary between conventional warfare and nuclear war. Many have jumped to the conclusion that nuclear bombs as such are weapons of terror and cannot be used except to create wholesale destruction. . . . I am convinced that nuclear bombs can be used for defense in the strictest sense of the word. They can be used in a way which will do minimal damage to the civilian population. . . ."

—Dr. Edward Teller addressing the Association of the U.S. Army, Washington, D. C., Oct. 26.

The Generals seem more hesitant than their civilian fans. While Secretary of the Army Brucker's address showed the extent to which our armed forces are being reequipped for nuclear war, General Taylor stressed that the Army "must not be completely dependent on atomic weapons. There are many conceivable situations," he warned, "when it may be to our own interest to establish restrictions on the use of these destructive weapons." One of them is when "in the resistance to aggression we are likely to find ourselves in a friendly country where we have come in response to an appeal of help. We will have every reason to wish to cause minimum destruction to accomplish our military ends. Hence the indispensable either-or-capability."

The Atom Bomb As Liberator

The Army Chief of Staff was much less sanguine than Dr. Teller. The "Father of the H-Bomb," the darling of the reactionaries in the Robert Oppenheimer case, is now stuck with a weapon too big to use. Dr. Teller is now the advocate of the vest pocket atomic weapon. His was an enthusiastic picture of small mobile units of electronic specialists armed with small atomic weapons with which "They could powerfully help to liberate oppressed peoples without bombing them to bits." But what if we use little ones and then the enemy uses bigger ones, so we retaliate. . . ? And in any case isn't the virtue of these little ones that they pack so much terrible destructive capacity? How could we use them in Budapest, for example, without killing an awful lot of innocent bystanders waiting to be liberated on earth, rather than in Heaven?

The Army Chief of Staff is a more thoughtful man than the scientist. In a speech next day at Lafayette College, he added a sober footnote to the meeting of army enthusiasts. "In considering the probable nature of future wars," General Taylor warned, "one is increasingly impressed with the fact that general atomic war is the greatest hazard to mankind today. At the same time, offsetting this ominous fact is the *feeling* that it is becoming increasingly improbable that any nation will deliberately embark upon such a war. The danger of suicide is too great for any country to stake its existence upon the dubious results of general atomic war. . . ." We italicized the word "feeling" because if this is true, why depend just on a comfortable "feeling"—why not try and negotiate?

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A New Summit Meeting Urgent to Prevent Intervention by Soviet "Volunteers"

The First Step Towards Peace Is To "Contain" The Conflict

(*Continued from Page One*)

us seems a necessity of self preservation to them. All three felt that a double game was being played at their expense and to their ultimate undoing.

Israel Lucky Not to Stand Alone

In this juncture we cannot have "non-involvement" merely by declaring it. Mr. Eisenhower's address Wednesday night, while full of good will to all and sundry, was a confession of weakness and of incapacity for the leadership fate has thrust upon the United States. If Britain and France had not taken advantage of the Israeli thrust against the *fedayeen* bases in the Egyptian desert to attack the Canal Zone, the U.S. might have and still may shut off aid to Israel. But how shut off aid to Britain and France? That *would* be the end of the Atlantic Alliance. Israel is lucky that it does not stand alone.

All we can hope for now is if the deed were done, 'twere well—as Lady Macbeth said—it were done quickly. If Nasser could be toppled before the other Arab States join in the melee and Soviet zone "volunteers" begin arriving to man those planes and tanks, peace might be patched up.

Society Column

Among the guests at the dinner to honor the 70th birthday of Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Embassy here last week were Mr. and Mrs. George Meany. Mr. Meany is said to be connected with the labor movement.

It is a pity that at this juncture France should have committed the folly of arresting those Algerian nationalist leaders on their way to peace talks. The North African leaders are not too fond of Nasser; they could have been separated from his influence; France could have used the Tunisian moderate Borguiba as mediator for peace in Algeria. The arrests look like treachery to the North African Arabs; it is another obstacle to hope of a settlement.

War threatens to engulf the world because empires old and new are crumbling; the British and French in the West, the Russian in the East. To prevent the conflagration from spreading it is essential first to get agreement between the two big powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., not to intervene. If they agree not to intervene, and the danger now is of Soviet intervention by "volunteers," the conflict can be limited and then mediated and brought to an end. A new summit talk is urgent and the best that can be said of Eisenhower's broadcast Wednesday night is that its conciliatory tone paves the way for friendly discussion. It is unfortunate that the crisis comes when Russia itself is unstable. For the revolution against Stalinism has reached a new and dangerous stage in Hungary and the new "time of troubles" in East Europe may be just beginning.

If It Had Only Happened in Budapest

The American press is full of praise for those fighting political oppression in Budapest and Hungary but silence engulfs the fate of heretics at home. It is so much easier to denounce the other fellow's despotism, and to fight for liberty at a safe and comfortable distance. Thus most papers ignored the brave act of Edward Fitzgerald, a one-time New Deal economist, who went to jail for six months last week in contempt of court rather than answer questions under the new Immunity Act.

Fitzgerald was once named by Elizabeth Bentley as a member of a wartime espionage ring. When offered immunity if he would testify, he declared that he was prepared to swear that he had no knowledge of espionage but would not answer questions about his own political beliefs or those of people he knew lest they be exposed to blacklist and persecution.

This is in the great tradition of the Puritan hero, John Lilburne, but who cares about heroes—unless they are dead or at a distance? How our press would ring with Fitzgerald's praises if he were a suspected anti-Communist protecting his friends in Budapest or Warsaw!

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